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ontributions to this year’s Merrill Research Retreat focus on analytics—those 
metrics that one might use to estimate a university’s excellence relative to that 
of its peers in various key areas. My paper builds on these studies and others 
like them, but my purpose is a bit different in that I focus on how people use such 
information to make decisions, especially when they are faced with an ever-increasing 
quantity and array of information, regardless of source or kind. I am, for example, just 
as interested in how and why people choose a particular brand of shampoo in their 
local Walmart as I am in how they select which academic journals to read and which 
research projects to pursue.  
The world today is a blur compared 
to what it was even a hundred years ago. 
Humans evolved in a world of few but 
significant choices, whereas most of us 
now live in a consumer world of almost 
countless, interchangeable ones, whether 
we’re shopping for shampoo or deciding 
what to read. Digital media now record 
almost all of these choices, and these 
“digital shadows” are increasingly be-
coming the subjects of “big data” re-
search. Some see this trend as a boon to 
understanding human behavior because 
of the sheer size of data sets that result 
from modern technology, including such 
things as cell phones and the Internet, but 
there are caveats. Before we delve too 
deeply into endless piles of information, 
it wouldn’t hurt to have at least a casual 
understanding of how humans process 
information, especially in the era of big 
data. The brief overview I present below 
might be useful for university adminis-
trators if for no other reason than, say, it 
provides a starting point for understand-
ing how faculty members, especially 
those in the sciences and behavioral sci-
ences, navigate through the onslaught of 
research-related information they face on 
a continuous basis. Not only has there 
been an exponential growth in scientific 
articles over the last decade, the annual 
growth in the number of journals is like-
wise staggering. How does one make 
good decisions—meaning those that are 
in the best interests (long as well as short 
term) of the researcher—when faced with 
an information overload?  
Several years ago, some of my col-
leagues and I began to review what has 
been written on the subject of decision 
making. What we found was that it had 
become commonplace for those involved 
with information processing to casually 
dip into the social sciences to see what 
tools they could borrow to better under-
stand human behavior. That’s fine to a 
point, but one problem with these free-
C
 48 
 
wheeling forays is that the various social 
sciences make considerably different as-
sumptions about the behaviors they de-
scribe. To the classical economist, for ex-
ample, rational actors monopolize the 
human stage, each with a predictable 
ability to maximize benefits and mini-
mize costs. These self-contained individ-
uals rarely depend on anyone but them-
selves for learning new behaviors. By 
contrast, evolutionary psychologists as-
sume choices are driven by ancient 
hunter–gatherer instincts that can seem 
irrational in a modern western society. 
Anthropologists have yet different as-
sumptions, namely that humans are 
highly social animals. This means that al-
most all their decisions involve social 
learning and negotiation—sharing food, 
learning from prestigious people in the 
kinship group, making alliances, and so 
forth. Indeed, evolutionary anthropolo-
gists and psychologists have argued per-
suasively that the anomalously large 
brain (neocortex) size in humans evolved 
primarily for social-learning purposes.1  
In view of the different processes 
and scales involved in decision making, 
especially decisions about the quality of a 
behavior or product, how do we deter-
mine which one predominates in a given 
situation? And what about the different 
perspectives that the disciplines bring? Is 
one right and the others wrong? No. The 
different disciplines operate at different 
scales, and they all make different, but 
useful, assumptions, ranging from the 
Figure 1. A conceptual map for understanding human behavior that plots case studies on two axes.7 The 
horizontal axis represents how agents make decisions. At the western end, agents learn individually, 
whereas at the eastern end they base decisions solely on the choices of others—they copy. The vertical 
axis represents the transparency of options in terms of payoffs and risks, from total transparency at the 
northern end to complete opaqueness at the southern end. The characteristics in the bubbles are intended 
to convey likely possibilities, not certitudes. 
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psychology of the thoughtful, isolated in-
dividual to the sociology of frantic mar-
ket populations. At one extreme, an indi-
vidual makes a well- (or otherwise-) in-
formed decision based on careful analy-
sis, and at the other extreme, people effec-
tively copy one another without thinking 
about it.  
In several recent publications, my 
colleagues and I show how big data—the 
kind most businesses and government 
bodies already possess—can be used to 
“map” decisions along two dimensions: 
social influence and information (Figure 
1).2–7 Granted, it is a simple heuristic 
map—and I do little more than summa-
rize it here—but it captures the essential 
elements of human decision making that 
should be of concern to businesses, mar-
keters, and even university administra-
tors. As we demonstrate, the data often 
show that “I’ll have what she’s having” is 
a better default setting than “I’ll select the 
rational option.” 
The Map The north–south axis rep-
resents how well people are informed 
about their decisions. At the northern 
edge of the map are behaviors that have 
some immediate, detectable, and con-
sistent impact of getting a decision right 
or wrong. The key word here is “detecta-
ble,” which means that an agent clearly 
sees and understands the landscape of 
costs and benefits associated with a deci-
sion. At the southern edge are decisions 
where there is no measurable difference 
in benefits, often where people are poorly 
informed about their choices or other-
wise overwhelmed by “decision fatigue.”  
The east–west axis represents the de-
gree to which agents make their decisions 
individually or socially. At the far west is 
one hundred percent individual learning, 
where agents rely only on their own 
knowledge of the costs and benefits of a 
particular behavior. At the far eastern 
edge is pure social learning, where peo-
ple do only as others do.  
The map requires a few simplifying 
assumptions to keep it from turning into 
something so large that it loses its useful-
ness for generating potentially fruitful re-
search hypotheses. First, it treats the var-
ious competencies of agents—intelli-
gence, education, cognitive skills, and so 
on—as real but too fine-grained to be vis-
ible at the scale of data aggregated across 
a population and/or time. Second, agents 
are not assumed to know what is best for 
them in terms of long-term satisfaction, 
fitness, or survival, given that rational 
agents, who are very good at sampling 
the environment, are not omniscient. 
Third, the distinction is blurred between 
learning and decision making. Techni-
cally, they are separate actions, but this 
distinction draws too fine a line around 
what ultimately influences an agent’s de-
cision and how clearly the agent can dis-
tinguish among potential payoffs. 
Fourth, although the map represents a 
continuous space, it is divided into quad-
rants for ease of discussion and applica-
tion to example datasets. Any characteri-
zations are based on extreme positions of 
agents within each quadrant. As agents 
move away from extremes, the character-
izations are relaxed.  
Not surprisingly, at any given mo-
ment populations are mixtures of social 
learners and individual learners. Every 
individual makes some decisions on his 
or her own and spends part of the time 
saying, “I’ll have what she’s having.” 
Equally unsurprising is the fact that the 
balance between social and individual 
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learning is important to how communi-
ties behave. This has been realized in 
studies of fish schools, bird flocks, and 
animal herds, where experiments reveal, 
for example, that logical, coordinated be-
havior of an entire school can result from 
a majority who are copying their neigh-
bors and a small minority who are acting 
individually, such as swimming toward a 
physical target in the pool. The school of 
fish might look as if all fish know where 
they are going when in fact only a very 
few are so well informed, but their swim-
ming direction diffuses through the 
school by means of social learning. A na-
ive observer might see a school of goal-
directed individuals, which would plot in 
the northwest, when in fact the school 
plots toward the southeast—mostly 
poorly informed social learning inter-
spersed with informed individual action. 
It doesn’t take much of an imagination to 
extend these examples to academic set-
tings, including large research groups. 
Why might any of this matter? Be-
cause most policymaking assumes that 
people all reside in the northwest—peo-
ple make their own decisions asocially, 
with their own goals and preferences. 
Although we might recognize types of 
behavior—for example, the modal be-
havior of assistant professors in a re-
search-intensive physics department—
we would, nonetheless, look at specific 
decisions as made by rational agents. To 
marketers, the northwest captures the 
implicit assumption embedded in sur-
veys about a product, regardless of social 
context—the friends and influences sur-
rounding the product. Both behavioral 
economics, with its (slightly) imperfect 
actors and their cognitive quirks, as well 
as evolutionary psychology, with its sup-
posedly evolved preferences, go in the 
northwest quadrant.  
The map would be just another four-
box heuristic if it were not for the fact that 
it relates specifically to patterns we can 
resolve from behavioral data, whether 
those data come from sales records or ci-
tations to scholarly articles and books. In 
terms of sales, the data would ideally per-
tain to the relative popularity of all avail-
able options through time, but more prac-
tically, it works just as well with a list of 
the most popular choices through time, 
such as weekly bestseller lists, for exam-
ple. It works the same with respect to sci-
entific citations, showing what (and who) 
is hot and what’s not. 
A Quick Tour Around the Map 
Perhaps a brief tour around the map 
will make this clearer. We can start in the 
northwest, as this is where the vast ma-
jority of economics has been for over a 
century. The northwest is where dissem-
inated information about a new service or 
product is enough—the medical litera-
ture for a beneficial new pharmaceutical 
product, for example—because each indi-
vidual has the time, motivation, and 
knowledge to think through all the inher-
ent costs and benefits of the decision. 
Laptop screen size, for instance, plots in 
the northwest because it shows a diag-
nostic bell curve of popularity, which re-
flects an optimal size that fits most peo-
ple’s needs. This means that people can 
choose individually based on clear phys-
ical constraints. The same applies to aca-
demic disciplines, where (we might sup-
pose) researchers continuously update 
their information about which topics are 
hot and which ones are not. Bell curves—
the signature of the northwest—center on 
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the best cost–benefit option and change 
little until something better comes along. 
More and more, though, people are 
forced to make rapid decisions from 
among a dizzying array of options and 
may resort to guesswork. This leads us 
toward the southwest, where people 
make poorly informed choices on their 
own. A novice choosing from among 
hundreds of listed mutual funds, or look-
ing at a wall of similar eyeglasses, may 
just as well pick at random. With huge se-
lections and not much difference among 
them, cheap commercial products often 
lie in the southwest—too similar for any-
one to notice in any social context. Hope-
fully, few of us in academic professions 
get caught in the southwest—certainly 
not an attractive place to be if one’s goal 
is tenure and promotion. 
With a great many options, the pop-
ularity of any particular choice is essen-
tially a lottery. Half a century ago, mar-
keting scientist Andrew Ehrenberg laid 
out the analytical expectations for the 
southwest quadrant.8 He showed that 
when consumers cannot tell the differ-
ence, the distribution of brand popularity 
is “short-tailed,” meaning that the proba-
bility of an option becoming extremely 
popular—the tail of the distribution—
falls off exponentially. Also, when people 
resort to guesswork, there should be no 
consistency in the rank-order of popular-
ity from one time period to the next. So 
while laptop screen size lies in the north-
west, most of the different laptop mod-
els—hundreds and hundreds of black 
laptops out there—plot in the southwest. 
Contrary to our default assumptions, 
it turns out that most behavioral ques-
tions of interest do not, at least according 
to market data, actually plot in the north-
west or southwest but rather in the east-
ern half of the map. Our intuition says we 
make our own decisions, but the data say 
that we are almost constantly influenced 
by other people’s decisions. Ideally, we 
are informed about our social influ-
ences—we listen to experts or we copy 
the most successful or prestigious people 
on a particular topic. Copying the most 
successful individuals means we have 
enough information to recognize real tal-
ent, such as hunter–gatherers knowing 
who the best hunter is in their small band 
or a group of graduate students knowing 
who the best scientist is in a biology de-
partment. Copying better results is social 
learning we all understand, and it ex-
plains why the bow and arrow rapidly 
spread throughout eastern North Amer-
ica 1400 years ago and why hybrid corn 
spread across the American Midwest.  
In the case of hybrid corn, consider 
the cumulative percentage of farmers in 
two Iowa communities who adopted hy-
brid seed corn over a period of 15 years: 
It took nine years for the frequency of hy-
brid planters to reach 20% but only six 
more years for it to reach fixation at 99% 
(Figure 2). Here we have a classic S-curve, 
with slow adoption followed by a signif-
icant upward shift in 1933–1934 and a 
peak in 1936–1937. Early on, a few farm-
ers experimented with hybrid corn, but 
this yielded almost no shifts in behavior 
until enough farmers began experiment-
ing with it that it finally reached a point 
where social learning took over. The 
same pattern can hold in academia, 
where “hot” new areas are slow to de-
velop but quick to spread once enough 
researchers are exposed to them.  
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Social-learning biases add an extra 
layer of complexity to social-diffusion 
models. An agent, for example, might di-
rect attention toward agents who meet 
one or more of the following criteria: 
They are prestigious, are related to the 
agent, are attractive, are similar in behav-
ior to the agent, and so on. Among these 
copying biases, perhaps the most adap-
tive for the copier are those that are di-
rected toward an agent or group of 
agents with which the copier seeks to 
identify. This can be a type of conformist 
bias, which can lead to social diffusion 
within the limits of the group that is con-
forming. A popular name might diffuse 
through a generation, a certain dialect 
through an ethnic community, or a cer-
tain set of interlinked customs through a 
community. In these cases, the copying is 
directed according to the rule of “copy 
the majority.” True conformity, in the 
sense of determining the majority deci-
sion and copying it, can introduce punc-
tuated effects or a degree of unpredicta-
bility that is uncharacteristic of standard 
diffusion curves. If copying is directed, 
then larger populations mean that agents 
often can observe popularity only locally 
(leaving aside modern online search en-
gines and popularity lists). In other 
words, agents often try to conform locally 
rather than globally. When conformity is 
directed locally, it might mean agents 
adopt something only after enough of 
their friends or colleagues have adopted 
it. 
Old as they may be, traditions are 
never static. All traditions are dynamic 
by definition, because they are passed 
down the generations by social learning. 
We take it for granted that an entire lan-
guage is re-created in the first years of 
every person’s life, but each time we 
Figure 2. Diffusion curve showing the cumulative use by year of hybrid corn in two Iowa farming 
communities, 1926–1941.13,14 This diffusion curve is a prototypical example of a “long-tailed” S-curve. 
The dotted lines mark the point on the curve with the highest rate of change. 
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learn a tradition, there are errors or delib-
erate creative changes. It is remarkable 
that cultural traditions can endure for so 
long. In Europe, the Little Red Riding 
Hood folktale, nuclear families, and 
square houses are all thousands of years 
old. Among our ancient hominin ances-
tors, the same technique for knapping 
hand axes was taught from one genera-
tion to the next for over forty thousand 
generations. This resilience of human be-
havior over the generations reflects our 
remarkably sophisticated ability to learn 
from one another. 
In the northeast quadrant, informed 
social learning—copying skill, quality, or 
prestigious individuals—calls on tradi-
tional social-diffusion theory, grounded 
in the model that marketing scientist 
Frank Bass proposed in 1969.9 Because 
the copying is well informed, there is co-
herence and logic to group behavior, as 
with schools of fish. We expect quality to 
be brought to the fore in the northeast 
through social interactions, as innova-
tions are discovered and communicated 
through a population. Better things inev-
itably become commonplace, but they 
take time to diffuse smoothly through the 
relevant population because people must 
introduce them to one another. 
Hierarchical social networks—each 
of us copying from the ranks above us, 
for example—help insure that the best 
options will spread, as shown by Erez 
Lieberman and colleagues at Harvard 
University.10 The Harvard group found, 
however, that diffused networks—peo-
ple copying more indiscriminately—tend 
to minimize this advantage. When every-
one just shrugs and says, “I’ll have what 
she’s having,” certain things become 
popular, but there is no guarantee that 
the best things are what rise to the top. 
This is the southeast quadrant. 
Undirected copying yields continu-
ous turnover in what is most popular, as 
long as there is some small flux of novel 
invention in the system. The diagnostic 
patterns of the southeast—long tail, con-
tinual turnover, and stochastic change—
can be tested against popularity data. The 
reason people use deodorant at all—for 
hygiene—lies in the northwest quadrant, 
but the market for the brand of deodorant 
lies in the southeast quadrant. Different 
brands of the same product are usually in 
the southeast, especially as people are 
flooded not only with product choices 
but also with myriad social influences of 
recommendations, top-10 lists, and “most 
popular” search results. Lacking any in-
herent distinctiveness or any obvious so-
cial reputation is how things wind up in 
the southeast—many brand names, hack-
neyed clichés, and getting tattoos, for ex-
ample.  
The Age of “What She’s Having”  
Understanding the southeast quad-
rant helps us explain why markets are 
changing faster than ever and in less pre-
dictable ways. Unpredictability is inher-
ent to the southeast. In a controlled exper-
iment, Columbia University’s Matt Sal-
ganik and colleagues found that people 
consistently chose the same sorts of mu-
sic when acting in isolation—north-
west—but when they were allowed to see 
what songs others were downloading, 
the behavior became more like “I’ll have 
what she’s having”—southeast—and the 
results unpredictable.11 
Of course, the social version of this 
already-classic experiment represents the 
online world today. The 1960’s term “fu-
ture shock” nicely describes our anxiety 
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as the world shifts from the northeast, 
when ancient traditions changed slowly 
over generations, to the southeast, where 
indiscriminant copying, random events, 
and global connectivity spread changes 
on the daily scale. We evolved in a world 
of few but important choices, but we live 
in a world of many, largely interchangea-
ble ones. Just as we feel adapted to the 
new order of the world, new fashions and 
technologies wash over us, new 
buzzwords enter our conversation, and 
“Buy! Buy!” becomes “Sell! Sell!”  
Eric Beinhocker describes the rapid-
ity with which this explosion of diversity 
has occurred as a hundred-million-fold, 
or eight orders of magnitude, difference 
since the time of our hunter–gatherer an-
cestors a little over 10,000 years ago.12 
Think about it: There are now over 50,000 
restaurants in the greater New York City 
area and over 200 television channels on 
cable TV. A Walmart store near JFK Inter-
national Airport has over 100,000 differ-
ent items in stock. Talk about choices! 
Despite being overwhelmed with 
meaningless choices and social influ-
ences, individual choice is still the mar-
keters’ default setting and, in our broader 
culture, perhaps even something of a re-
ligion. This certainly applies to the aca-
demic world as well. Canny marketers 
can use this mistaken assumption to their 
advantage. If a brand becomes popular in 
the southeast, through indiscriminant 
copying, this luck can be consolidated by 
moving it to the northwest and concoct-
ing post-hoc reasons for its success. Or it 
can be moved to the northeast because of 
reputation and brand loyalty. Much of 
what marketers mistakenly call “loyalty” 
however, remains in the southeast, sus-
tained merely through its own inertia and 
bound to be ephemeral. Sales data be-
come crucial here, in the patterns distin-
guishing the southeast from the north-
east.  
In traditional societies, differences 
between groups arose over many genera-
tions. In northern Cameroon and Chad, 
for example, neighboring Moussey and 
Massa groups intermarry and share a 
common genealogical origin and technol-
ogy, yet they grow different crops, raise 
livestock in different ways, and dislike 
each other’s cuisine. Small amounts of 
randomness—introduced through crea-
tivity, nonconformity, or accident—get 
amplified through local social learning. 
In this Internet era of decision fatigue, as 
we are forced to copy more and more, dif-
ferences between groups may therefore 
be amplified, despite the “globalized” 
connectivity.  
These elements—flux, learning, se-
lection, and random events—bring about 
a new age of models of human behavior. 
If the market no longer fits in the north-
west, there is little value in trying to pre-
dict rational and optimal outcomes. If the 
market plots in the southeast, it is better 
approached as a matter of insurance or 
secure investment—coping with unpre-
dictability by maximizing probabilities, 
minimizing risks, and placing many 
small bets. Probability distributions, pop-
ulation size, invention rate, interaction 
networks, and time span become the key 
parameters in floating with the tides. 
Marketing becomes less about satisfying 
“the” archetypal consumer and more 
about how many interconnected consum-
ers affect each other’s behavior. Old 
ideas, such as the sanctity of the “brand,” 
have to be recast in terms of this bigger, 
more anthropological map. To do all this, 
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it pays to have data analysts schooled in 
evolutionary theory, but if lacking all 
this, just point to someone and say, “I’ll 
have what she’s having.” It’s almost al-
ways a safe bet. 
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